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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief, the Appellant will be referred to as the
"Plaintiff" while the Respondent will be referred to as the
"Defendant"•

This matter was heard in the trial court pursuant to

the trial court's sua sponte Order To Show Cause why the action
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The trial court,
in ruling upon the matter, dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint and
entered

default

Counterclaim.

judgment

against

Plaintiff

on

Defendant's

For this reason, the only transcript is that of the

brief order to show cause hearing.

The record on appeal consists

entirely of the records of the office of the Court Clerk referred
to in this Brief by the designation "R" followed by the appropriate
page number and the transcript of the hearing, referred to in this
Brief by the designation "T" followed by the appropriate page
reference.

Attached as addenda to this Brief are copies of (i)

Defendant's Precipe and Default on Defendant's Counterclaim, (ii)
the trial court's Order To Show Cause, (iii) Plaintiff's Objection
to entry of Default Judgment, (iv) the Order of the First Judicial
District Court in and for Cache County

("trial court") dated

September 29, 1988 and (v) the Default Judgment entered against
Plaintiff

dated October

26, 1988.

The Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure will be referred to herein as "URCP".

The Rules of the

Utah Supreme Court will be referred to herein as "RUSC".
emphasis is added.
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All

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §782-2(3) Utah Code Annotated of 1953/ as amended, being a case
involving a Judgment rendered by the "trial court" over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from the Default Judgment entered against
the Plaintiff by the trial court pursuant to its sua sponte Order
To Show Cause, subsequent hearing and Order. The Default Judgment
was signed and entered by the Court on October 26, 1988, over
Plaintiff's objection.

Plaintiff filed its Notice Of Appeal on

April 4, 1989 and filed concurrently therewith its Motion For
Relief under Rule 60(b) URCP and Motion For Disqualification.

Due

to the concurrent filing by the Plaintiff of its Notice Of Appeal,
Motion For Relief and Motion For Disqualification, the trial court
determined

in

its Memorandum

Decision

of May

4,

1989

(copy

attached) that it was without jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff's
Motion For Relief and determined that Plaintiff's Motion For
Disqualification was moot. Accordingly, this appeal is apparently
taken from the Default Judgment rather than from any denial by the
trial court of Plaintiff's Motions.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY PROCEDURAL RULES
The following are determinative constitutional provisions or
rules that support the actions of the trial court:
Constitution

of the

United

States,

Amendment XIV, Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
2

United States and of the State wherein they reside• No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section

78-3-4(1),

Utah Code

Annotated

(1)
The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law.
Rule 4(a),

RUSC

(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.
In a case in which
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the district
court to the Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or
order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall
be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from.
Rule 5(a)

and (b)(1),

URCP

(a) Service:
When required.
Except as otherwise provided
in these rules, every order required by its terms to be
served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint
unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be
served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every
written notice other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment,
notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), and
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No
service need be made on parties in default for failure to
appear except as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default
proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.

(b)

Service:

How made.

3

(1)
Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney
the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon
the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a
copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or,
if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the
court. Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing
it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his
office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or,
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous
place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to
be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete
upon mailing.
Rule

8(d),

URCP

(d) Effect
of failure
to deny.
Averments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as
to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken
as denied or avoided.
Rule 55(b)(2),

URCP

(2) By the court.
In all other cases the party entitled to
a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If,
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary and proper.
Rule 58A(b),

(c)

and (d), URCP

(b)
Judgment in other
cases.
Except as provided in
Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all
judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the
clerk.
(c) When judgment
entered;
notation
in register
of
actions
and judgment
docket.
A judgment is complete and shall be
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien
on real property, when the same is signed and filed as herein
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation
4

of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment
docket.
(d) Notice of signing
or entry of judgment.
The prevailing
party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service
of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time
for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision,
ISSUES
The issues before the Court for resolution are as follows:
I.

Is the Plaintiff's appeal untimely, leaving the Court

without jurisdiction?
II.

Should the Court now consider matters raised for the

first time by the Plaintiff on appeal that were not raised at the
trial court level?
III.

Was the trial court biased against the Plaintiff,

requiring recusal of the trial court Judge?
IV.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP, prior to the
entry of the Default Judgment against Plaintiff?
V.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering

Plaintiff's default on Defendant's Counterclaim?
VI.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing

Plaintiff's Complaint?
VII.

Is the Default Judgment entered by the trial court void

for lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process?

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, filed its Complaint against
Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff, on June 30, 1987.
Immediately after being served with a Summons and Complaint in this
matter,
issuance

Defendant
of

initiated

formal

interrogatories

and

discovery,
taking

the

including

the

deposition

of

Plaintiff's president, in July of 1987. After requesting the Court
for an extension of time within which to answer Plaintiff's
Complaint, Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim and served
the Defendant therewith on August 14, 1987.

Plaintiff having

failed to respond to Defendant's Counterclaim within the twenty
(20) day period allowed by Rule 12 URCP, on September 9, 1987
Defendant

filed

Counterclaim.

its

Precipe

and

Default

on

Defendant's

The Precipe and Default were also served upon the

Plaintiff under Rule 5 URCP on September 9, 1987. Defendant served
additional discovery requests upon Plaintiff on September 15, 1987.
Without moving to set aside the Default, the Plaintiff filed a
dilatory answer to Defendant's Counterclaim on September 18, 1987.
Plaintiff

having

failed

to

respond

to

Defendant's

discovery

requests within the time provided by the URCP, Defendant filed its
Motion To Compel on December 4, 1987.

Plaintiff then filed its

Motion For Protective Order on December 21, 1987.
was ruled on by the trial court.

Neither Motion

After the case had been pending

for approximately fourteen (14) months and without any affirmative
action being taken by the Plaintiff, excepting Plaintiff's Motion
For Protective Order, the Court sua sponte issued its Order To Show
6

Cause as to why the action should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute and setting a hearing date on the matter for September
26, 1988.

The Order To Show Cause was served on counsel on

September 13, 1988.

The trial court's Order specifically stated

that counsel's failure to appear would be considered acquiescence
in the trial court's order of dismissal.

At the hearing on

September 26, 1988, Defendant was not present, was not represented
by counsel and had not otherwise responded to the Court's Order.
Defendant's counsel, Brad H. Bearnson, appeared at the hearing,
made no objection to the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint and
made motion to the Court for entry of Default Judgment against the
Plaintiff on Defendant's Counterclaim, pursuant to the earlier
Default.

Thereupon, Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed and the

trial court ordered entry of Default Judgment against Plaintiff on
Defendant's Counterclaim.

Plaintiff's Objection To Dismissal was

received by the Clerk of the trial court on September 26, 1988 but
subsequent to the hearing.
Defendant then served the proposed Order, Default Judgment and
Affidavit For Attorney's Fees and costs upon the Plaintiff on
September 27, 1988 and filed the same with the trial court.
Plaintiff objected to the entry of the Default Judgment and the
proposed Order, on September 27, 1988. The trial court signed and
entered the Order on September 29, 1988.

The Order provides for

the dismissal

and

of Plaintiff's

Complaint

entry of

default

judgment against the Plaintiff under Defendant's Counterclaim.
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Thereafter, the trial court signed and entered the Default Judgment
on Octobesr 26, 1988.

This appeal by Plaintiff followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The procedural chronology of this case as shown from the
Clerk's file and the transcript of the hearing of September 26,
1988 is as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Complaint was filed June 30, 1987.

(R. 1-3)

While Defendant was served with a Summons and Complaint in the
matter, Plaintiff has apparently failed to provide the Court with
a Return of Service, as none appears in the record.
2.

Shortly after service of the Summons and Complaint upon

the Defendant, Defendant's counsel prepared its first set of formal
discovery requests which were filed with the trial court and served
upon Plaintiff on July 14, 1987. (R. 4-10)

Defendant then noticed

and took the deposition of Plaintiff's President, Mr. Sidney
Thatcher, on July 27, 1988.
3.

(R. 11-12)

Defendant filed its Motion For Extension Of Time within

which to answer Plaintiff's Complaint on July 22, 1987 (R. 13-14)
which was followed by the Memorandum Decision dated August 12, 1987
of the trial court denying the entry of default against the
Defendant on Plaintiff's Complaint, dated August 12, 1987. (R. 15)
Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim on August 14, 1987.
(R. 16-18)

Also on August 14, 1987, Defendant served the Answer

and Counterclaim upon Plaintiff by mail, pursuant to Rule 5 URCP.
(R. 18)

Under Rule 12 URCP the Reply to the Counterclaim was due

September 3, 1987.
8

4. No reply to Defendant's Counterclaim having been filed by
the Plaintiff within the twenty (20) day period permitted under
Rule 12 URCP, Defendant filed its Precipe and the Default of the
Plaintiff, relative to Defendant's Counterclaim on September 9,
1987,

(R. 19-22) On that same date copies of the Precipe and the

Default were served upon the Defendant by mail,
5.
Plaintiff

On September 15, 1988, Defendant filed and served upon
its

Second

Set Of

Production Of Documents.
6.

(R. 20 and 22)

Plaintiff

filed

Interrogatories

And

Request

For

(R. 23-29)
its dilatory Answer

to

Defendant's

Counterclaim on September 18, 1987, some thirty-five (35) days
after the filing and service of the Counterclaim upon Plaintiff and
fifteen (15) days after it was due.

(R. 30-31)

7. Plaintiff never made a motion to set aside the Default and
Plaintiff has never claimed, whether in its brief on appeal or with
the trial court, that it did not actually receive or was not
properly served with the Counterclaim or with the Default.
8.

Without responding to Defendant's first set of discovery

requests, on October 19, 1987 Plaintiff filed its response to
Defendant's second set of discovery requests.
9.

(R. 32-40)

Plaintiff having failed to respond to Defendant's first

set of discovery requests, Defendant filed its Motion For Order
Compelling Discovery and served the same upon Defendant on December
4, 1987.

(R. 41-42)

Thereafter, Defendant filed its Motion and

Memorandum for Protective Order and Opposition To Motion.
44)

(R. 43-

The parties each filed responses to opposing party motions.
9

(R. 45-50) No ruling was made on either Motion by the trial court.
10.

More than fourteen

(14) months from the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint, the trial court issued its sua sponte Order
To

Show Cause

Plaintiff

on

September

13, 1988, directing

counsel

for

and Defendant to appear before the trial court on

September 26, 1988 at 10:03 a.m. and to there show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

(R. 51-52)

The Order To Show Cause specifically stated, "Counsel's failure to
appear will be considered acquiescence in entry of an order of
dismissal."
11.

At the scheduled September 26 hearing, Defendant's

counsel, Brad H. Bearnson, appeared representing the Defendant.
However, neither Plaintiff or its counsel was present nor had
Plaintiff otherwise responded to the trial court's Order To Show
Cause.

(R. 65-66 and T. 1)

12.

From June 30, 1987 to September 26, 1988, Plaintiff had

engaged in no formal discovery and the only action taken by
Plaintiff in the matter was in response to action

(discovery)

initiated by Defendant.
13.

Subsequent to the September 26 hearing, Plaintiff's

Objection To Dismissal was received by the Clerk of the trial court
along

with

Plaintiff's

Interrogatories.
14.

First

Request

For

Admissions

And

(R. 54-61)

On September 27, 1988 Defendant served Plaintiff with

the proposed Order (R. 65-66), proposed Default Judgment (R. 7374) and Affidavit for attorney's fees and costs.
10

(R. 62-64)

Defendant filed the Affidavit with the trial court on September 27,
1988 and the Order and Default Judgment were filed on September 29,
1988 and October 3, 1988, respectively.
15. Prior to execution and entry of either the proposed Order
or the Default Judgment, Plaintiff filed its Objection thereto on
September 27, 1988.

(R. 68-69) Plaintiff made no other objection

to either the proposed Order or Default Judgment until Plaintiff
filed its Notice Of Appeal.
16. The trial court signed and entered the Order on September
29, 1988.

(R. 65-67)

17. The trial court executed and entered the Default Judgment
on Defendant's Counterclaim on October 26, 1988, over Plaintiff's
Objection.

(R. 73-75)

No evidentiary hearing was held pursuant

to Rule 55(b)(2) URCP.

However, Plaintiff made no request for an

evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) and did not object to the
lack of such hearing in its Objection to Entry of Default Judgment.
(R. 68-69) The Defendant did not serve notice of entry of judgment
upon the Plaintiff.
18.

Plaintiff alleges that it did not become aware of entry

of the Default Judgment until March 8, 1989.
19.

(R. 94)

Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on the Default

Judgment on April 4, 1989.

(R. 76) Thereafter, on April 5, 1989,

Plaintiff filed motions for Relief from the Default Judgment and
for disqualification of the trial court Judge, together with a
supporting affidavit and memoranda.

11

(R. 85-116)

20.

Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From Default Judgment was

not ruled upon by the trial court on the basis that the trial court
had lost jurisdiction of this action upon filing of the Notice of
Appeal.

The

trial

court

determined

Plaintiff's

Motion

For

Disqualification was moot and likewise did not rule thereon.

(R.

127-128)
21.

Apparently feeling that the trial court still retained

some authority to act on this matter, the Plaintiff filed its
Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities relative to its
earlier motion for relief from the Default Judgment, under Rule
60(b)(5) and (7) URCP, with subsequent respons ive pleadings from
both parties.

(R. 156-311)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

In violation of Rule 4(a), RUSC, Plaintiff failed to file

its Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days after entry of the
Default Judgment.

Neither Plaintiff's concurrent motions nor

Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff Notice of Entry of Default
Judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(d) tolled the time for appeal.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's appeal is untimely.
II.
court.

The issues raised on appeal were not raised at the trial
However/ Plaintiff had ample opportunity to do so.

After

the trial court entered its order directing entry of Default
Judgment

against

Plaintiff, but before actual

Plaintiff

filed

Judgment.

Plaintiff failed to raise the issues of judicial bias

its

Objection

to

12

the entry

entry thereof,

of

such

Default

and lack of evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP in its
Objection and should not be granted a review of those issues.
III.

The issue of bias is to be first addressed in the sound

discretion of the trial court Judge against whom bias is alleged.
However, Plaintiff failed to raise the issue of bias in the lower
court and there is no record provided the Court upon which to make
a review of such issue.

In the absence of such a record, there is

no showing of bias and the decisions of the trial court should
stand.
IV.

Rule 55(b) URCP provides that default judgment may be

entered by the clerk on a claim for a sum certain or where the sum
can be made certain by computation.

Default judgment is to be

entered by the Court in all other cases.

The Default Judgment

entered against Plaintiff was for a sum certain and as such did not
require an evidentiary hearing.

Further, the necessity of such a

hearing is left in the discretion of the trial court and where no
abuse of that discretion is shown by Plaintiff the absence of such
hearing has no effect on the validity of the Default Judgment
entered against Plaintiff.
V.

Where

Defendant's

Plaintiff

Counterclaim,

failed

to

the trial

file

a

timely

court did

reply to

not abuse its

discretion in entering Plaintiff's Default thereon.

Plaintiff's

previously filed Complaint cannot reasonably constitute a reply to
Defendant's Counterclaim inasmuch as Rules 8 and 12 of the URCP
require specific responses to claims for affirmative relief and
state that averments in a counterclaim are deemed admitted if not
13

properly denied•

It is within the sound discretion of the trial

court to determine whether or not Plaintiff made a sufficient reply
to Defendant's Counterclaim and this Court should not interfere
with that decision unless it clearly appears the trial court abused
its discretion.

The Plaintiff failing to make such a showing, the

Court affirms the decision of the trial court in entering Default
Judgment against Plaintiff,
VI.

The authority of a court to dismiss a party's Complaint

is an inherent power necessarily vested in the Court.

Plaintiffs

are required to prosecute their claims with due diligence.

Where

Plaintiff took no affirmative action in this case for a period of
approximately fourteen (14) months from the date of filing its
Complaint, the Trial

Court

did

not

abuse

its discretion

in

dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.
VII.

A judgment is presumed to be valid and every reasonable

presumption in favor of the validity of a judgment will be indulged
absent a clear showing of irregularity.

Where the trial court had

jurisdiction over both parties and the subject matter and where
there are no limits on judgments rendered by the trial court, the
Judgment is not void for lack of jurisdiction.

Further, where the

Plaintiff has been provided notice and opportunity for hearing and
where there is no showing of a lack of fairness, the Plaintiff has
not been denied due process of law.
ARGUMENTS
I.
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS UNTIMELY, LEAVING THE COURT WITHOUT
JURISDICTION.
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Rule 4(a) RUSC reads in pertinent part as follows:
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the district court to the supreme court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within thirty (30 ^ days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from, . .
Rule 58A(b) and (c) states:
(b) . . . All judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed
with the clerk.
(c) A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for
all purposes . . . when the same is entered and filed as
hereinabove provided.
On October 26, 1988 the trial court entered the Default
Judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's Counterclaim.
74)

(R. 73-

More than five (5) months after entry of the final Default

Judgment, April 4, 1989, Plaintiff filed its Notice Of Appeal.
(R. 76) Accordingly, Plaintiff's appeal is untimely and leaves the
Court without jurisdiction.

Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277,

282 P.2d 845 (1958); Former Rule 73(a) URCP and Rule 4 RUSC.
Further, neither the subsequently filed motions by the Plaintiff
nor Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff notice of entry of the
Default Judgment tolls the time for appeal on the Default Judgment.
Concurrent with its filing of the Notice Of Appeal herein,
Plaintiff

filed separate motions for relief

from the Default

Judgment, under Rule 60(b) URCP, and for disqualification of the
trial judge, under Rule 63 URCP.

These motions by Plaintiff were

both untimely and were not of a nature that would act to toll the
time for appeal.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that such

improper and untimely motions do not toll the time for appeal.
15

Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Shettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah
App. 1989), citing Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah
1987).

Plaintiff had opportunity and did in fact object to the

entry of Default Judgment against it on Defendant's Counterclaim.
(R. 68-69)

Plaintiff's objection in this regard was properly

construed by the trial court as a motion for relief under Rule
60(b) URCP, since once judgment by default is entered it can only
be set aside pursuant to a Rule 60(b) Motion.

Calder Brothers

Company v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926, N.4 (Utah 1982). The trial
court's emtry of its Order (R. 53 and 65-66) dismissing Plaintiff's
Complaint and directing entry of default judgment on Defendant's
Counterclaim, together with the trial court's subsequent entry of
default judgment (R. 73-75) constitutes a denial of Plaintiff's
Rule 60(b) motion.

Accordingly, if Plaintiff believed the trial

court erred in denying his motion, the appropriate remedy was by
direct appeal within the prescribed thirty (30) day period. Arnica
Mutual Insurance Company, supra at 970.
Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff notice of entry of the
Default Judgment does not operate to toll Plaintiff's time for
appeal herein.

Rule 58A(d) states:

(d) Notice of signing
or entry of judgment.
The prevailing
party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service
of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time
for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision.
Accordingly, the Rule specifically provides that failure of a party
to give notice of entry of judgment has no effect upon the time for
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filing a notice of appeal. Where Plaintiff received copies of the
trial court's Order (R. 65-66) directing entry of Default Judgment
against Plaintiff and of the proposed Default Judgment, Plaintiff
is left without excuse.

The Court merely signed the Order and

proposed Default Judgment as it said it would.

Plaintiff simply

failed to appeal the matter within the time required by law.
Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.
II.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER MATTERS RAISED BY THE
PLAINTIFF ON APPEAL THAT WERE NEVER RAISED AT THE TRIAL
COURT LEVEL.
This Court has consistently held that matters not raised at
the

trial

court

level

will

not

be

considered

on

appeal,

particularly where such matters could have been resolved in the
lower court.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987);

Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah 1980).

Plaintiff was

given notice of the trial court's proposed entry of default
judgment against Plaintiff in the form of the Order (R. 65-66),
Affidavit (R. 62-64) and Default Judgment (R. 73-74) served upon
Plaintiff. With the knowledge that default judgment may be entered
against Plaintiff and with the further knowledge that such entry
may be imminent, Plaintiff filed an objection dated September 30,
1989.

(R. 68-69)

The only issue raised by Plaintiff in its

objection that is raised by the Plaintiff on appeal is that
Plaintiff's Complaint somehow constituted an "inherent" response
to

Defendant's

subsequently

filed

Counterclaim.

Plaintiff's

objection to the lower court made no claim of (i) judicial bias or
17

(ii) the lack of an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP,
two (2) issues now raised by Plaintiff on appeal.
these issues

The absence of

in Plaintiff's objection to the lower court is

particularly conspicuous where virtually all of the facts and
circumstcinces now cited by the Plaintiff were apparent to the
Plaintiff at the time of filing the objection dated September 30,
1988 in the lower court.
The Affidavit of Plaintiff's counsel in re disqualification
(R. 104-115) cites the following factors in support of his claim
of judicial bias:
(a) Daines' appointment and subsequent proceedings in
the case of State v. Hardy, initiated in 1985, Case No. 20896
(R. 105);
(b) The Order issued July 27. 1988 in State v. Hardy
wherein Judge Christoffersen was allegedly held in contempt
on July 27, 1988 (R. 110, 111).1
(c)
LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, Case
commenced in 1983 (R. 106);

No.

830021896,

(d) Daines v. Cache County, Case No. 87-NC-0082-S, filed
in 1987 and in which Judge Christof fersen is named as a party
Defendant (R. 105-106); and
(e) Sew Easy v. Cache County, Case No. 87-NC-0081-W,
initiated in 1987 and in which Judge Christoffersen is also
named as a party Defendant.
Upon even a cursory review of Daines' Affidavit and the above
factors cited by Plaintiff's counsel in support of Plaintiff's
argument of judicial bias, leads to the immediate conclusion that
virtually every fact upon which Plaintiff relies for its claim of

x

The Order referred to by Plaintiff makes no reference or
finding that Judge Christoffersen was held in contempt.
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judicial bias was known to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel at
the time Plaintiff filed its objection to entry of the Default
Judgment dated September 30, 1988.

This is particularly clear

where Plaintiff was a party to one of the actions and Plaintiff's
counsel was also counsel of record for one or more parties in each
of the actions cited by Plaintiff in support of its claim.
At the time that Plaintiff filed its objection dated September
30, 1988 no evidentiary hearing had been held in regard to the
proposed Default Judgment, nor was such a hearing scheduled. There
is no evidence the Plaintiff ever sought or requested such a
hearing. This issue was previously considered by the Court in Katz
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986).

In Katz, the lower court

had entered a Default Judgment against a party but had erroneously
failed to hold a hearing on the issue of damages under Rule
55(b)(2) URCP.
court

There the Court held that even though the lower

erroneously

failed

to hold

a

hearing

on

damages, the

appealing party could not assert such failure on appeal without
having afforded the lower court an opportunity to rule thereon.
Also citing Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah
1984) and Atkins v. Household Finance Corp. of Casper, 581 P.2d 193
(Wyoming 1978).
Accordingly, Plaintiff, having failed to raise the issues of
judicial bias and failure to hold an evidentiary hearing with the
trial court, is now barred from raising those issues on appeal.
Plaintiff's

"new"

issues on appeal
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should

be disregarded

as

belated, untimely and of no consequence where never raised at the
trial court level•
III.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT BIASED AGAINST PLAINTIFF.
In discussing the issue of bias and judicial prejudice, this
Court defined those terms as being the existence of a "hostile
feeling or spirit of illwill toward one of the litigants or undue
friendship or favoritism toward one". Haslem v. Morrison, 190 P.2d
520, 523.

(Utah 1948) However, the question of bias and prejudice

is to be addressed in the sound discretion of the judge against
whom such bias or prejudice is alleged, to be determined in the
same manner as any other matter coming before him.

Haslem at 523,

citing Muser v. Third Judicial District Court, 106 Utah 373, 148
P.2d 802.
Here, however, the issue of bias has not been raised in the
lower

court,

disqualify.

excepting
(R. 100-103)

in

Plaintiff's

untimely

motion

to

Accordingly, the trial court has not

had opportunity to review the same and thus no record is provided
this Court upon which to review the issue of bias and prejudice.
The mere filing of a motion and affidavit alleging bias and
prejudice does not ipso facto cast suspicions upon the trial judge
sufficient to disqualify him or to render his decisions a nullity.
Further, the fact that the trial judge may have been a party
litigant in one or more cases in which Plaintiff or its counsel was
also a party or in which Plaintiff's counsel acted as counsel for
one or more other parties is not of itself sufficient to disqualify
20

a trial court judge or to render his determinations in the lower
court void or voidable.

See State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1090 (Utah

1988).
The record on review has not one shred of evidence that the
trial judge harbored any prejudice or bias against Plaintiff.
Without such evidence in the record and no timely request for
recusal ever being filed by Plaintiff, the decisions and judgments
rendered by the trial court must be valid.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING UNDER RULE 55(b)(2) URCP,
PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
A Default Judgment is not void by reason of the trial court's
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP.
Application for the Default Judgment was made by motion to the
court during the September 26, 1988 hearing (T. 1 ) , in accordance
with the first sentence of Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. Rule 55(b) states:
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk.
When the plaintiff's claim against a
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can only by
computation be made certain, and the defendant has been
personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal
service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of the
plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs
against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure
to appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court.
In all other cases the party entitled to
a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If,
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary and proper.
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As is reflected in the Rule, no evidentiary hearing need be
held if the claim upon which the Default Judgment is based is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
certain•

Here, Defendant's claim clearly specified a sum certain,

i.e., $5(3,000.00. Accordingly, even the clerk of the trial court
could have entered the Default Judgment.

The Court's Order of

September 29, 1988 directed the Clerk of the Court to enter Default
Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim in the amount of $50,000.00
plus attorney's

fees and costs as supported by Affidavit of

Defendant's counsel.

(R. 65-66)

Based on such an Order one can

hardly argue $50,000.00 is not a sum certain.
hearing is required.

Consequently no

While Default Judgment was signed by the

trial court judge, the clerk of the trial court actually enters it
of record in the judgment record book of the Court.

(R. 65-66)

Whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary is left to the
discretion of the trial court, as the Rule specifically states that
the court "may" conduct such hearings "as it deems necessary and
proper".

In this regard, this Court has repeatedly held that the

trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless there is
clear

abuse

of

the

trial

court's

discretion.

Airchem

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973);
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

Where a hearing is

discretionary and where Plaintiff never requested a hearing, the
trial court's procedure is absolutely correct.

The trial court

could hardly abuse discretion Plaintiff never asked it to exercise.
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V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING
PLAINTIFF'S DEFAULT.
Rule 12 URCP states in relevant part:
. . . The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim
in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
•

• •

This Rule clearly requires an affirmative, subsequent reply to a
counterclaim.

Otherwise, there is no joinder of the averments in

the counterclaim•

In general, if matters which should be replied

to are not met in or by reply, they are deemed admitted•
Am.Jur.2d, Pleading, §176 and §192.

61A

Further, this Court has

specifically held that where a defendant makes a counterclaim
denominated as such and the plaintiff fails to reply, the averments
of the counterclaim were deemed admitted.

Murdock v. Blake, 184

P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971); Rule 8(d) URCP; Connor v. Roval Globe
Insurance Company, 286 SE.2d 810 (1982).
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's Counterclaim within
the required twenty (20) day period.

Defendant served its Answer

and Counterclaim upon the Plaintiff by mail, pursuant to Rule 5
URCP on August 14, 1987.

The Reply was due under Rule 12, URCP,

on or before September 3, 1987.

Plaintiff's Default was entered

by the trial court on September 9, 1987, some twenty-six (26) days
after the filing and service of Defendant's Counterclaim.

Without

moving to set aside the Default, Plaintiff filed a purported reply
on September 18, 1987.

However, Plaintiff's reply, thirty-five

(35) days after the filing and service of Defendant's Counterclaim

23

and nine

(9) days after the entry and service of Plaintiff's

Default, is a nullity.
While Plaintiff argues that its Complaint, constituted an
"inherent"

reply

to

Defendant's

remains wholly unsupported.

Counterclaim,

that

statement

Indeed, counsel has no idea what that

means and knows of no such concept in American jurisprudence.

The

sole authority cited by Plaintiff is Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167
(Utah 1954), which simply holds that it is the substance of a
pleading rather than its title that determines its nature and
character. There is no Reply to Defendant's Counterclaim.

Indeed,

both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law of this
jurisdiction make it clear that pleadings, such as counterclaims
which state specific allegations and make prayers for relief,
require specific, substantive responses. Murdock, supra; Rule 8(d)
URCP.

Plaintiff did nothing.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court as to

whether or not Plaintiff made a sufficient reply to Defendant's
Counterclaim.

This Court has consistently ruled that it will not

interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that the
trial court abused its discretion.
v. Romero, 609 P.2d

Department of Social Services

1323, 1324 (Utah 1980).

The trial court

correctly applied the Rules. In fact, given what Plaintiff did and
did not file with the trial court, there is nothing else the trial
court could properly have done.
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VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

ITS

DISCRETION

IN

Though not entirely clear in its Brief, Plaintiff appears to
take issue with the trial court's dismissal of its Complaint, as
part of its violation of due process argument.

In this regard, it

is noted that the Court, in Charlie Brown Construction v. Leisure
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1987) stated "the authority
of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has
generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by a
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage

their

own

affairs

so

as to

achieve

the

orderly

and

expeditious disposition of cases." Citing Link v. Wabash Railroad
Company, 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-1389, 8 L.Ed.2d
734 (1962) Plaintiffs are required to "prosecute their claims with
due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal."

Maxfield v.

Fischler, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975).
In the case at hand, it is noted that apart from its response
to discovery action taken by Defendant (R. 42-43), Plaintiff took
no affirmative action in this case from the time the Complaint was
filed on June 30, 1987 until its dilatory reply to the court's sua
sponte Order to Show Cause (R. 60-61), a period in excess of
fourteen (14) months.

Additionally, after the trial court had

entered its Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 65-66), no
motion or other action was taken by Plaintiff

to have such

Dismissal set aside or reconsidered by the trial court.
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Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a -matter within the
broad discretion of the trial court.

This Court should not

interfere with that decision unless there is a clear showing that
the trial court abused its discretion and there is a likelihood an
injustice has been wrought.

Charlie Brown, supra; Department of

Social Services v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980).

No

such showing has been made by Plaintiff.
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTf
HAD JURISDICTION AND PLAINTIFF RECEIVED ALL DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED.
The concept of voidness as it applies to judgments is properly
limited.

In Brimhall v. Mecham, 22 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525, 526

(1972) while affirming a judgment sought to be declared void, this
Court specifically stated that the concept of a void judgment is
to be "...narrowly construed in the interest of finality".
judgment is not presumed to be erroneous.

A

On the contrary, it is

presumed to be valid until vacated by some proper proceedings
instituted directly for the purpose of correcting errors therein.
Ericksen v. McCullouqh, 91 Utah 159, 63 P.2d 595 (1937).

Every

reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a judgment will
be indulged, where there is nothing on the record to support
allegations of irregularity.

46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 39.

In

this regard, Plaintiff undertakes a heavy burden it cannot meet.
Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and over the
subject matter and where the judgment rendered is not in excess of
the

jurisdiction

or power

of

the court, no
26

other

error

or

irregularity can make the judgment void.
§14.

46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments,

There being no jurisdictional limits on judgments rendered

by a district court, the only matter for inquiry by the Court here,
as to the issues of jurisdiction, is whether the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and over the
parties.

§78-3-4(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

On these

points the record is clear. The Plaintiff against whom the Default
Judgment lies, invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court when it
filed its Complaint (R. 1-3), thereby submitting itself to its
jurisdiction. All acts complained of by Plaintiff in its Complaint
occurred

in

Cache

County

and

Defendant

submitted

to

the

jurisdiction of the trial court without objection, in filing its
Answer and Counterclaim.

Accordingly, the existence of the trial

court's jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter is evident
and not subject to serious question.
Neither did the trial court lose its jurisdiction over either
the parties or the subject matter upon dismissal of Plaintiff's
Complaint. Rather, the trial court retains jurisdiction over both
the parties' and the subject matter of the action until all matters
before

it, whether

raised

in

a

crossclaim, have been disposed of.

complaint,

counterclaim

or

To hold otherwise would lead

to the ultimate conclusion that any party filing a complaint,
counterclaim or crossclaim with a district court would be able to
unilaterally

deprive

that

court

of

jurisdiction

by

merely

withdrawing its claims or engaging in other acts or omissions that
may result in the dismissal of such claims.
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The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, libeirty or property without due process of
law".

The United States Supreme Court has never attempted to

define with precision the words "due process of law," and in fact
the phrase probably never can be defined so as to draw a clear and
distinct line, applicable to all cases. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 92 L.Ed. 986, 68 S.Ct. 763. While it is true that no precise
definition of the phrase "due process of law" can be given, the
courts have frequently defined the phrase in general terms. It has
been said that due process of law must be understood to mean law
in the regular course of administration through courts of justice
according to those rules and forms which have been established for
the protection of private rights.

Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S.

172, 44 L.Ed. 119, 20 S.Ct. 77.

Endicotte - Johnson Corp. v.

Smith, 266 U.S. 291, 69 L.Ed. 293, 45 S.Ct. 63.

It is, in short,

a general law administered in legal course according to the form
of procedure suitable and proper, given the nature of the case.
Due process of law has been broken down into its procedural and
substantive aspects which in turn have been construed in modern
jurisprudence to require the elements of notice and opportunity
for hearing

(procedural), and essential

fairness and lack of

arbitrariness (substantive).
However, the mere fact that a person is unsuccessful in a
matter involving life, liberty or property does not itself present
a showing that there has been a violation of due process.

The

Fourteenth Amendment does not raise a federal question in every
28

case to test the justice of a decision.

New York and NER Co. v.

Bristol, 151 U.S. 56, 38 L.Ed. 269, 14 S.Ct. 437.

If there has

been a hearing or opportunity for hearing there is no violation of
a guarantee.

Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536# 70 L.Ed. 1074, 46

Supreme Court at 613.
Ironically, Plaintiff's claim of denial of due process is
itself so vague that Defendant cannot identify the basis of such
claim. Plaintiff makes no specific reference to a violation of the
URCP.

The record makes it clear that the URCP were complied with

in every material respect.

Plaintiff was given notice of (i)

Defendant's Counterclaim (R. 16-18), (ii) the Default (R. 19-20)
entered against it, (iii) the trial court's proposed dismissal of
the action pursuant to the Court's sua sponte Order (R. 51-52) and
(iv) the proposed Entry Of Default Judgment against Plaintiff as
specified by the Court's minute entry (R. 53) and the proposed
Order (R.65-66) as eventually signed by the trial court judge.
Plaintiff had its day in Court on September 26, 1988 Plaintiff simply chose not to attend.

Plaintiff never requested

an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. Even after
Plaintiff was apprised of the Court's action in dismissing its
Complaint and ordering entry of Default Judgment against Plaintiff
on Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiff never raised the issue of
an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP, even though the
actual

Default

Plaintiff

Judgment

for almost

(R.

73-74) was

thirty

(30) days.
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not

entered

Even

had

against

Plaintiff

requested such a hearing, under 55(b)(2) it is discretionary with
the trial court.
Plaintiff's
Procedures

were

real

objection

applied

is

equitably,

that

the

fairly

Rules

and

as

of

Civil

intended.

Plaintiff does not seek due process - Plaintiff seeks to escape due
process.

The rules of the Court are clear, precise and were

properly applied by the trial court.
Plaintiff has failed to present any rational argument to the
Court as to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court or
as to why it has been denied due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's appeal is not timely and should be dismissed. For
fourteen (14) months Plaintiff essentially did nothing to prosecute
its case.

Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing on September

26, 1988 in response to the trial court's Order To Show Cause and
Order to Plaintiff to appear or have its case dismissed. Plaintiff
failed to object in a timely manner to the Default Judgment entered
against it.

There has been no showing by the Plaintiff that the

trial court engaged in any abuse of its discretion.

Plaintiff has

not been deprived of a right by any arbitrary actions of the trial
court or without an opportunity to press and present its claim.
Plaintiff's rights have been limited only by its own inattention,
neglect and inaction.

The actions of the trial court are proper,

evidence a careful attention to and application of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and should be affirmed.
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DATED this y ^ ^ t a y of September, 1989.

Brad H. Bearnson
HAND CARRY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand carried four (4) exact copies of
the foregoing Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Reversal,
Motion To Strike And Supporting Memorandum, to Plaintiff's
Attorney, David Rainey Daines, at 1158 North 1750 East, Logan,
Utah, 84321, this Aft*3ay of September, 1989.

Tl-ffO/Ujh PAJOA-J
BHB/4
sew. sup
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Brad H. Beamson
bLSON & HOGGAN
[Attorneys for Defendant
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
[Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AMD FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
[SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC.
ja corporation,
Plaintiff,

PRECIPE

vs.
pAVID R. MONTAGUE,
Civil No. 25813
Defendant.

[TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE NAMED COURT:
Plaintiff having been duly served with a Counterclaim and
[having failed to answer or otherwise plead to the same within the
litime allowed by law you will please enter the default of the
NPlaintiff in the above captioned matter.
DATED this 9th day of September, 1987.

Brad H. Bearnson
Attorney for Defendant
BHB: 50

DN & HOGGAN
ORNEYS AT LAW
WEST CENTER

Numbe

•^mjf

'O BOX 525
AN. UTAH 8432 I

SEPq 1387
8STHS. ALIEN, ( M

01)752-1551

AM

^

3

2/

-2MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Precipe to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R. Daines at USU Box 1328,
Logan, Utah, 84332, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 9th day
of September, 1987.

DLSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 525
LOGAN. UTAH 84321
(801)752-1551
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]Brad H. Bearnson - #1512
bLSON & HOGGAN
[Attorneys for Defendant
j56 West Center
(P.O. Box 525
[Logan, Utah 84321
^Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT ~r THE EIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, .N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC.
ia corporation,
P

DEFAULT

vs
[DAVID R. MONTAGUE,
Civil No. 25813
Defendant.

!i
!j
I i i t h i s a c t i o n the P l a i n t i f f S e w Ea s y I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. ha v i
:
b e e n r e g u 1 a r 1 y served w i 11 i p ro c e s s, a nd ha ving f a i 1 e d t o a pp e a r
a n d a n s w e r t h e D e f e n d a n t's C o u n t e r c 1 a i m o n f i 1 e h e r e i n , a i i :I t h e
1
1ime a 11owed by 1 a w f o r a n s w e r i n g having e x p i r e d , the d e f a u 11 oJ:
the said P 1 a i n t i ff S e w Easy I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. in the p r e m i s e s , is
j h e r e by

d i I 1y e n t e r e d a c c o r d i n g

•

w.

!
Witness the Clerk of the sai-" sour with the s^i
jaffixed this 9th day of September, 1 987,

thereof

Set! i S . Allen
County Clerk

T5,.

•?
•

\f\r\\ ' t\r

OLSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 525
LOGAN, UTAH 0432!
(801) 752-1 S51

SEPq 1387
SCTHSAUBI,Clerf(
H—ZZ^f
Deputy

-;-"Tr

«

-

*

•

I

•2-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d an e x a c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g
(Default t o P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y , David R. Daines a t USU Box 1 3 2 8 ,
Logan, U t a h , 84332, postage
prepaid
in Logan, Utah, this 9 t h day
of S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 8 7 .

>frgE^/*-^
•sy

M&U,
/^s^,

3LSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

56 WEST CENTER
PO BOX 5 2 5
LOGAN UTAH 84321
(801)732-1551
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

SEW EASY INDUSTRIES

)

Plaintiff,
)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO
-VS-

>

Case No.
MONTAGUE, DAVID R.

870025813 CV

)

Defendant.

On it's own Motion, the Court orders Counsel in the above
case to appear before the Court on:

09/26/88

at

10:03 AM,

and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
Counsel's failure to appear will be considered
acquiescense in entry of an order of dismissal.
Dated this

13

t

day of ^ g JQX7 , 19.

VaKOY CHRISTOFFERSON

DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies of the foregoing Order to Show Cause, mailed to:

this |g>

n/On

SEE

A T T A C H M E N T

day of ^ Q . ^ A 7 , 19.9S

c^- ** ^ O . .

' ' Deputy Clerk

SF.P1 31088
SETH S. AHEM, Clerk

5l

A T T A C H M E N T
DAINES, DAVID
Attorney for Plaintiff
USU BOX 1328
LOGAN
UT 84321

BEARNSON, BRAD H.
Attorney for Defendant
56 WEST CENTER
BOX 525
LOGAN
UT 84321

Z.

t-o3 SEP 27

*\2:3k

CACHif ocj;rrv oi rp*
DAVID RAINEY DAINES (#801)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
USU Box 1328
Logan, Utah 84322
Telephone: (801) 753 — 2721

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES
OBJECTION TO ENTRY
OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ON COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 25813

DAVID R. MONTAGUE
Defendant.
Comes now the
Default

Plaintiff

Judgment

as

and objects

against

the

to

the

entry

of

on

the

Plaintiff

Counterclaim on the following grounds:

1.

The Plaintiff has not defaulted.

2.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiffs

Complaint

inherently denied all of the counterclaim

allegations which arose out of the same transactions and
occurrences alleged in the Complaint in the first instance.
3.

The record on answers to discovery and depositions

clearly and precisely delineate Plaintiffs defenses to the
counterclaim.
4.

Plaintiffs

have

filed

a formal

Answer

to

the

dumber
Nut
'

5=m

counterclaim,

SEP 3 n 1388

I^Q

IHS. ALLEN, C!
sTtta/mmcteift
iff—""" '—J*S

nomrfu

5.

The Defendants have made no motion for entry of a

default judgment.
6.
entered,
that

all

Though

apparently

a default

parties have acted for about
issues

were still

was

erroneously

a year on the

active.

Should

the

basis
court

determine that Plaintiff should take formal action to have
the default removed from the record the Plaintiff should be
given

an

adequate

opportunity

to

procedurally

perfect

its

removal.

David Rainey Dai

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby
1988

I mailed

Objection

certify

that

a true and

to Entry

on

the

30th

day

of

September,

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

of Default

Judgment

on

Counterclaim

the following, U.S. mail, postage prepaid:
Brad H. Bearnson
Miles P. Jensen
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah
84321-052

^avid R a i n e y
DRD:m
DM:007

ioQ

Q*ijies

to

Brad H. Bearnson (#3633)
DLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
pAVID R. MONTAGUE,
Civil No. 25813
Defendant.

taSON

& HOGGAN

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
5 6 WEST CENTER

The Court on its own Motion, issued its Order to Show Cause
Why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute the same, setting the matter for hearing on the 26th day
pf September, 1988, at 10:03 a.m. Defendant timely filed its
Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant also filed a
[Counterclaim against the Plaintiff which was not timely responded
|to by the Plaintiff. The Court entered the Default of the
plaintiff as to Defendant's Counterclaim on the 9th day of
September, 1987. The Court having reviewed the file in this
matter and having held the hearing on the Court's Order To Show
Cause on the 26th day of September, 1988 at the hour of 10:15
a.m., the Defendant being represented thereat by its counsel, Brad
H. Bearnson, and the Defendant being neither present nor
represented by counsel, it is hereby

IrQ

P O BOX 5 2 5
OGAN, UTAH 8 4 3 2 1

WumberQ

(801)752-1551

&*?

SEP2<M083

mi 07.--fMt^i3g- * , — _ £

nan*

-2ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint be and is hereby dismisse<
by reason of Plaintiff's failure to prosecute the same;
FURTHER ORDERED, that Default Judgment on Defendant's
'Counterclaim, against the Plaintiff, be entered by the Clerk in
the principal amount of $50,000.00, plus attorney's fees and costj
as supported by the Affidavit of Defendant's legal counsel.
ENTERED this JL9 -^day of September, 1988.

ML ^ Li
VeNoy^
Chris toftersep/
irt Judge
District

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Order to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R. Daines at USU Box 1328,
Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 27th day
of September, 1988,

BB/35

SON & HOGGAN
TORNEYS AT LAW
,6 WEST CENTER
PO BOX 525
SAN UTAH 84321
801)752-1551

POOX

Ua

072PKE!98

RECEIVED
ISBBOCT - 3 . PI* 3- 2U
Brad H. BearnsonC^(S33)»l!f.Tv i;L£RK
lOLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a corporation,
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
fbAVID R. MONTAGUE,

Civil No. 25813
Defendant.

.SON & HOGGAN
TTORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
PO BOX 525

The Plaintiff, Sew Easy Industries, Inc., having failed to
timely plead or otherwise defend in this action and default having
been entered against said Plaintiff.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant, David R. Montague, be awarded
judgment against said Plaintiff in the amount of:
$50,000.00
Damages;
$
105.70
Accrued interest to date of judgment,
$
448.05
Accrued costs to date of judgment,
$
850.00
Attorney's fees to the date of this
judgment and such sums in addition thereto
as Plaintiff may reasonable accrue in
attorney's fees in enforcing and
collecting this judgment and make proof
thereof to this Court hereafter.
TOTAL JUDGMENT,
$51,403.75

X3AN. UTAH 8432 1
(801)752-1551

# >

dumber

'. 77 2^1980

SffBS,_flUE*I.Ctaft
An

W

eOOX 0 7 2 PAGE 7 7 0
n a

-2with interest on the total judgment at twelve percent (12%)
per annum as provided by law from the date of this judgment until
paid, plus after-accruing costs.
DATED this 2*th day of S^p?omber, 1988,.

VeNo^r
Distri
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Default and Default Judgment to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R.
Daines at USU Box 1328, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in
Logan, Utah, this 27th day of September, 1988.

BB/35

Brad seams on

SON 8t HOGGAN
rTORNEYS AT LAW
56 WEST CENTER
PO BOX 525
GAN UTAH 84321
(SOI) 752-1 551

072«a77i
7^

